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It’s a Family Affair: 





On the 4th November 2017, the Lebanese Prime Minister, Saad Hariri resigned from 
office whilst in Riyadh, blaming Iranian manipulation of events. A day later, a number 
of prominent members of the Al Saud royal family were arrested, along with around 
200 protuberant members of the country’s business elite. On the 6th November, a 
missile launched at the country’s airport. Across 3 days, the severity of the 
challenges facing Saudi Arabia in the coming years became visible for all to see. In 
charge of responding to the challenges is the Kingdom’s new Crown Prince, the 32 
year old Mohammed bin Salman, essentially the power behind the throne. Known by 
‘Saudi watchers’ as MbS, the son of King Salman was appointed to the office of 
Crown Prince in June 2017 and wasted little time in seeking to transform the 
Kingdom’s fortunes. The office of Crown Prince is not without challenges, as four of 
the last five crown princes of Saudi Arabia have failed to become King. Yet few 
expect such a fate to befall MbS as a consequence of the moves made to secure his 
position.  
 
Such problems of succession and indeed power struggles within the upper echelons 
of the Al Saud are not new. Take, for instance, the struggles between Saad and 
Faysal over who was to rule the Kingdom and the factionalism within the ruling 
family that shaped political life since the death of Ibn Saud. Yet the case of MbS is 
perhaps of more importance than the struggle between Saad and Faysal as it is the 
first instance of a move beyond the sons of Ibn Saud, to a different generation of 
rulers of the Saudi kingdom. This move brings a number of prominent princes into 
competition, as the sons of previous Kings – and their sons – also have legitimate 
claims for the throne. 
 
To understand the emergence of Mohammad bin Salman as Crown Prince – and to 
consider the trajectory of Saudi Arabia more broadly – we must consider the 
Kingdom’s historical past whilst placing its present into socio-economic and 
geopolitical context. As such, this article begins by offering a brief outline of the 
emergence of Saudi Arabia and the mechanisms through which Ibn Saud was able to 
establish the third – and current – Saudi-led state across the Arabian Peninsula. We 
then turn to a consideration of bin Salman, looking at his background and political 
history before considering the domestic challenges facing Saudi Arabia and finishing 
with an exploration of the geopolitical environment within which the Kingdom 
operates.  
The Family as State 
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The third – and current – Saudi state was established by Abdul Aziz ibn Abdul 
Rahman Al Saud – known by most as Ibn Saud – in 1932, when he united the 4 pieces 
of the Arabian jigsaw. With the provision of weapons and subsidies from the British, 
Ibn Saud was able to both create an expansionist political project and consolidate his 
position when faced with restless tribal dynamics, seen in the ikhwan rebellion and 
later manifestations of such tensions such as the seizure of the Grand Mosque in 
1979. Yet as Madawi Al Rasheed suggests, this political project was not necessarily 
reflective of indigenous desires or aspirations. Rather, she suggests that the 
establishment of Saudi Arabia was “a state imposed on people without a historical 
memory of unity or national heritage”.1 Yet this only secured the territorial borders 
of the new state and in the years that followed, Ibn Saud embarked on the process 
of building a nation to reside within its borders. 
 
Unable to draw upon memories of shared history or to cultivate narratives of 
collective identity that would ensure political unity and cohesion in the manner 
outlined by Benedict Anderson, Ibn Saud was forced to find alternative ways to 
ensure the survival of his political project. One such technique was that of inter-
tribal marriage, where it is alleged that the new ruler married into 30 different tribal 
families, immediately cultivating a large support base whilst also creating a large 
royal family, which continues to pose political problems to this day.2 This helped to 
secure a large tribal support base that has been retained through the use of tribal 
norms and customs within the political structures of the modern Saudi state. Such 
moves were not without consequence, resulting in the emergence of an estimated 
10,000 princes. The structure of succession in Saudi Arabia is patriarchal, yet passed 
from Ibn Saud to his eldest son, to the next eldest and so forth. 3 King Salman, 
however, is one of the last remaining sons of Ibn Saud4, resulting in a move to the 
next generation of Saudi rulers. At this point, an estimated 80 princes have a claim to 
the throne, 5 revealing the extent of the political challenge facing MbS.6  
 
Integral to the formation of Saudi claims to legitimacy stem from the fusion of the Al 
Saud family with the Wahhabist ulemma, drawing upon historic relationship 
between the two groups and providing the new Saudi state with a degree of 
legitimacy not found in their tribal lineage particularly evident given the plethora of 
                                                 
1 Madawi Al-Rasheed, A History of Saudi Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002) p3. 
2 Darryl Champion, The Paradoxical Kingdom: Saudi Arabia and the Momentum  of Reform 
(London: C. Hurst & Co., 2003),  p68. It is also believed that Ibn Saud had 45 legitimate  
sons. The number of daughters was not counted.  See also: Harry St. J. Philby, The Heart of 




4 Along with Muqrin, a former Crown Prince, and Ahmad. 
5 Anthony H. Cordesman, Saudi Arabia: Guarding the Desert Kingdom (Oxford: Westview 
Press, 1997), p26.   
6 11.03 PM, 06.11.17 https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/927672843504177152  
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tribal groups across the Arabian Peninsula. 7 Such tribal groupings posed serious 
challenges to the political rule of the Al Saud, with greater claims to tribal legitimacy 
than the ruling tribe.8  
 
To circumvent such challenges, the Al Saud drew upon the religious alliance with 
Wahhabism, which helped the construction and consolidation of a Saudi nationality, 
in spite of the myriad challenges. Religion thus served a prominent role in the fabric 
of the state, with the Al Saud deriving Islamic legitimacy from being the ‘protectors 
of the two holy places’ and espousing support for Islamic norms. Yet the use of 
Islamic rhetoric to engender legitimacy serves as a ‘double-edged sword’ whenever 
the norm is violated, leaving the ruling regime open to criticism. 9 Amidst increased 
Westernisation, tensions between tradition and modernity, old and young, public 
and private, such allegations10 became more prominent. The fusion of tribe with 
state was undertaken as a prominent tool of control within the formative stages of 
the Kingdom, wherein dissent against the Al Saud was framed as dissent against the 
state. With this in mind, forms of political dissent against the ruling elite were 
pushed to the margins and framed as being simultaneously against the state and 
against God. 
The Rise of MbS and Challenges to the Kingdom 
 
Previously occupying the office of Minister of Defence – itself a prominent portfolio 
in the Kingdom – MbS built his reputation through a bold foreign policy agenda 
designed to restrict Iranian influence across the region. There is little doubt that the 
Crown Prince is reform minded, seeking to move the Kingdom away from its reliance 
upon the dual pillars of oil and Wahhabist faith. In doing so, however, he risks 
creating serious schisms at the very heart of the Saudi social contract. To understand 
such desires, we must briefly consider the journey that MbS took to get to the office 
of Crown Prince.  
 
Born in the summer of 1985 to Princess fahda bin Fala bin Sultan bin Hathleen, bin 
Salman received his education in Riyadh before studying Law at King Saud University. 
After graduating he began his career in the private sector before becoming more 
involved in governmental work, taking a keen interest in youth and business 
development programmes.11 In 2009 he was appointed as special advisor to the 
governor of Riyad – his father – and after Salman took the throne in 2015, bin 
                                                 
7 Joseph Nevo, ‘Religion and national identity in Saudi Arabia’, Middle  Eastern Studies, Vol. 
34, No. 3 (1998), p34 
8 For more on this see: Madawi Al Rasheed and Loulouwa Al Rasheed, ‘The Politics of 
Encapsulation: Saudi Policy towards Tribal and Religious Opposition’, Middle Eastern Studies, 
Vol. 32, No. 1 (January 1996)  
9 Ibid and Rasheed, 2002,Op.Cit.,p144.   
10 Joseph Kostiner, ‘State, Islam and Opposition in Saudi Arabia, The Post  Desert Storm 
Phase’, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1997), [Online]. Available 




Salman was appointed Defence Minister on January 23rd 2015. On 21st June 2017 
MbS was appointed to the office of Crown Prince. 
 
Described simultaneously as a reformer, hardliner, revolutionary, reactionary, 
Machiavellian, a ‘prince of chaos’, and “a new Abdel Aziz” it is fair to say that there 
are a range of different views of MbS and his political activities across Saudi Arabia.12 
Supporters have framed him as a hard working business-minded leader, keen to 
challenge corruption with a desire to modernize whilst avoiding the trappings of 
royalty. In contrast, critics view him as power-hungry, a ‘young up-start’, and 
someone unaware of the dangers of reforming too much too fast.13 Such views are 
hardly surprising given the speed of reform across the Kingdom since MbS was 
appointed as Crown Prince.  
 
There is general agreement that the Kingdom faces serious economic challenges 
stemming from the construction of the Saudi economy, dominated by the public 
sector where bloated bureaucracies employ a large percentage of the workforce. 
Indeed, the public sector has long been used as a mechanism to stave off domestic 
dissent as seen in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. Although Saudi 
Arabia avoided large-scale protests seen by a number of other states across the 
Middle East, King Abdullah offered a welfare package worth around $130 billion that 
included a number of new jobs in the Ministry of Interior, infrastructural 
improvements and a rise in the minimum wage.14 The economic package was 
supported by a number of token political reforms including allowing women to stand 
and vote in municipal elections.15 
 
Such challenges have been exacerbated by the rapid drop in oil prices, which hit the 
Saudi coffers dramatically, quickly wiping out a sizeable portion of the Kingdom’s 
capital reserves. The ability to placate domestic unrest through vast economic 
handouts appears unsustainable. Amidst such challenges, dissent across the 










14 Steffen Hertg, ‘The Cost of the Counter Revolution in the GCC’, in The Middle East Channel 
(31.05.11) Available at:  
http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/31/the_costs_of_counter_revolution_in_t
he_gcc.  
15 Caryle Murphy, “GCC to Set Up $20bn Bailout Fund for Bahrain and Oman,” The National, 
March 11, 2011, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/gcc-to-set-up-20bn-
bail- out-fund-for-bahrain-and-oman.  
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Kingdom is rapidly growing, leading to calls for political reform, an end to corruption 
and demands for a written constitution, particularly from Shi’a groups based in the 
Eastern Province.16 
 
Demonstrating an awareness of the deeper socio-economic concerns within Saudi 
Arabia, stemming from a number of concerns about the longevity of oil supplies17, an 
increasingly large youth boom and high levels of public sector employment, MbS set 
out a vision to facilitate a transformation to a ‘post-oil’ world, referred to as Vision 
2030. Central to this vision was the idea of NEOM, the first carbon neutral city in the 
world, straddling Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, designed to be the city of the 
future. Requiring serious economic investment, it was designed to be at the 
forefront of the Kingdom’s economic and social innovations, although the 
relationship with poorer parts of the Saudi population is yet to be fully explored. 
NEOM also possesses territorial innovation, straddling Saudi, Egyptian and Jordanian 
borders.  
 
The following statement reveals a great deal about relations between Saudi Arabia 
and its neighbours: 
  
The sovereign laws will be within framework of the Saudi law, like defense, 
national security, counter terrorism and similar threats. Foreign policy. [sic] 
These things will be retained at the Saudi government levels. But commercial 
rules and others will be under Neom itself. They will be given the right to 
regulate all of these details in a way that serves the purposes of objectives of 
Neom.18 
 
This suggests that the security of NEOM will be run in line with Saudi Arabia’s 
defence and security policy, yet beyond this, the new development will be 
autonomous, demonstrating the dominance of Saudi Arabia across the area. In 
addition to such economic innovation, MbS also sought to open the Kingdom’s 
borders to tourism. In a similar vein, he also lifted a 35 year ban on cinemas and 
began to work towards creating different forms of entertainment across the 
Kingdom.  
 
The Saudi Kingdom is often described as a patrimonial regime, where networks of 
patronage exert influence across bureaucratic and institutional landscapes. When 
coupled with the tribal history of the state, it is easy to see how such a fabric is 
created and maintained as a mechanism of control. Such conditions mean that those 
who exert power often have huge financial resources and MbS is no different. In the 
                                                 
16 See, for example, the work of Toby Matthiesen, The Other Saudis: Shiism, Dissent and 
Sectarianism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) and Madawi Al Rasheed, Muted 
Modernists: The Struggle over Divine Politics in Saudi Arabia (London: Hurst, 2015) and Madawi 
Al Rasheed, Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
17 Steffen Hertog, Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia (Ithaca, NY: 




summer of 2015, bin Salman purchased the luxury yacht The Serene for around $500 
million19 less than a year after he purchased another yacht now known as Pegasus 
VII for a paltry $120 million. At the same time, MbS was Head of the Royal Court and 
Defence Minister, pushing for the Kingdom to accept economic reforms that would 
include budget cuts, reductions in salaries, and general implementation of austerity 
measures following the drop in oil prices that resulted in serious depletion of Saudi 
Arabia’s currency reserves. The anger that many felt was palpable. Writing in Open 
Democracy, Alain Gabon referred to MbS as the region’s “biggest threat to peace, 
stability and hope for democratization”. Gabon later revealed collusion between 
MbS and the former owner of The Serene to avoid paying around 84 million euros in 
tax. 
 
Yet such reforms face challenges not only from those opposed to change but also 
from the seemingly endemic corruption across the Kingdom. Within a year of 
accepting the role of Crown Prince, MbS ordered a series of arrests designed as a 
crackdown on corruption that resulted in 11 well-known princes being detained – 
including the Kingdom’s richest man, Prince Waleed bin Talal – along with around 
200 prominent businessmen and ex ministers.20 A video that was shared on social 
media revealed the prince saying that "I assure you anyone involved in corruption 
will not be spared, whether he is a prince or a minister or anyone". Although well 
received by some,21 as a number of analysists are quick to point out, the Crown 
Prince has not declared his family’s own financial records, nor has he explained the 
1.1 trillion riyals (an estimated $250 billion) that has allegedly gone missing under his 
father’s rule.22 The threat posed by endemic corruption was described by one Saudi 
official as  
at every level, and there are hundreds of billions of riyals that are lost from 
the national economy every year […] The point here was mainly to shock the 
system, to send a message that this will not be tolerated anymore and that 
nobody is immune.”23 
 
For some, the series of arrests was seen as a positive move for the Saudi economy 
and for the Kingdom as a whole. Yet for others, it was a rampant display of power 
from a Crown Prince wishing to secure his position within the Al Saud. In an 
interview for a BBC series on the House of Saud, Madawi Al Rasheed, a staunch critic 
of the ruling dynasty described the crackdown as a “theatrical performance”, as 
much for external audiences as for domestic actors as the Crown Prince consolidates 
power. In addition, more than 20 influential clerics and intellectuals were arrested 
                                                 
19  http://anonhq.com/saudi-arabias-crown-prince-buys-550-million-yacht-instantly-despite-
implementing-austerity/ 
20 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/11/saudi-arrests/545015/  







on suspicion of espionage and having links with the Muslim Brotherhood and, by 
extension, Qatar.24  
 
As Robert Mason recounts, such events were just the beginning: “Sheikh Saud Al-
Mojeb, the attorney general, stated that the detentions were “merely the start of a 
vital process to root out corruption”, he sought to float 5 percent of the Saudi 
Aramco shares (dubbed the biggest IPO in history), allowed women to drive, 
tolerated the reopening of cinemas, has plans for a tourism industry, and reigned in 
the powers of the religious police.”25 In interviews of my own, a number of Saudis 
spoke of efforts to develop a tourism industry based on the restoration of a number 
of UNESCO recognised heritage sites, including the development of luxury hotels 
across the region.26 Yet such moves may prove controversial, challenging the very 
foundations of the Saudi state by opening the ‘Land of the Two Holy Places’ up to 
people of all faiths and, perhaps more importantly, stressing the importance of pre-
Islamic history.  
 
The Crown Prince announced a desire to move the Kingdom towards a ‘more 
tolerant’ form of Islam, declaring an intention to crack down on members of the 
ulemma who opposed his reform agenda. This was supported by anti-terror 
legislation designed to fulfil the Crown Prince’s agenda of destroying extremist 
ideologies through regulation of myriad forms of expression. 27  The need to 
eradicate such groups and prevent the financial support for them is thus a central 
part of MbS’ modernization strategy, essential not only to ensure domestic stability, 
but also the continued support of foreign allies. Beyond the borders of the Kingdom, 
MbS established an anti-terrorism coalition, comprised of Sunni states, designed to 
vanquish terrorism from the region and to secure state sovereignty. Domestically the 
move was largely well received by young Saudis, many of whom were encouraged by 
the efforts of the young prince.  
The Prince and Regional Dynamics 
 
Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has long been driven by a desire to restrict Shi’a 
influence across the region, for regional and domestic calculations. In doing so, the 
Kingdom is able to restrict Iranian influence whilst preventing the empowerment of 
Shi’a groups within Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath of the Arab Uprisings this policy 
became more prominent as Saudi Arabia took on a counter-revolutionary role to 
prevent increases in Iranian power across the region. With the appointment of MbS 
as Crown Prince, this pro-active foreign policy has increased. The Kingdom’s recent 
foreign policy can be understood by considering two close friendships. The first with 
                                                 
24 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-41260543 
25 https://www.thecairoreview.com/tahrir-forum/winds-of-change-in-riyadh/  
26 See: https://www.thehotelshowsaudiarabia.com/exhibitor/why-exhibit-at-the-hotel-
show-saudi-arabia/  http://www.hiamag.com/ةحايس/رابخأ-رفسلا/531276-٥%D9%A0-عو رشم-
قدنف-ديق-ذيفنتلا-  




Mohammed bin Zayed28, the de facto ruler and Crown Prince of the United Arab 
Emirates, and the second with US President Donald Trump. 
 
Whilst bin Zayed certainly exerts a great deal of influence, the most powerful friend 
of MbS is in Washington. The first official trip made by President Trump was to 
Riyadh, demonstrating not only the importance of US-Saudi relations – which had 
been rocky during the Obama presidency – but also the personal relationship 
between Trump and MbS. Closing the triangle was a strong relationship between bin 
Zayed and Trump, which saw the two Crown Princes’ visit Riyadh in the Spring of 
2017 ahead of the event in Riyadh which was organised by the White House – not 
the sate department – in a breach of diplomatic protocol.29  
 
This triumvirate reveals the importance of personalities and individuals within the 
contemporary Middle East. Whilst the Obama presidency was met with a trepidation 
across the region, Trump’s ‘interactional’ presidency was well received by the likes of 
bin Zayed and MbS who were able to strike up good relationships with someone 
who understood the importance of the personal nature of regional politics. 
 
In a book written by a Trump regime insider, it was reported that the President 
remarked that  "We've put our man on top", after King Salman’s decision to replace 
Mohammed bin Nayef as Crown Prince.30 The decision prompted vocal support from 
the Trump administration for the father and son team. On one occasion, he tweeted 
“I have great confidence in King Salman and the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, 
they know exactly what they are doing....”31 demonstrating support for the 
Kingdom’s anti-corruption drive. Such friendships have proved essential for Riyadh 
to construct its foreign policy, with alliances in Abu Dhabi and Washington providing 
logistical and diplomatic support in a number of arenas. Under MbS, Saudi foreign 
policy can be understood through analysis of two strands of thought: 1, to reduce 
Iranian influence across the Middle East and Islamic world; and 2, to secure Saudi 
Arabia’s position as hegemonic actor within the GCC.  
 
To many in Riyadh and across the Arab part of the Gulf, Iran has long been seen as 
the bête noir of Middle Eastern affairs. Since the revolution of 1979 and the 
establishment of the Islamic Republic, competition to derive legitimacy from Islam 
has been an arena of existential importance for Saudi Arabia. After the US-led 
invasion of Iraq and 2003 and the removal of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party 
from power, the two have become increasingly involved in a geopolitical struggle to 
shape the nature of the region, harnessing sectarian divisions for geopolitical 
purposes as a means of exerting influence in Iraq and Lebanon. 32  Instability 
stemming from the Arab Uprisings escalated tensions in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen, 
                                                 
28 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/22/world/middleeast/qatar-saudi-emir-boycott.html  
29 http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/19/world/donald-trump-first-foreign-presidential-
trips/index.html  
30 Michael Wolff, Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House (London: Little Brown, 2018) 
31 11.03 PM, 06.11.17 https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/927672843504177152  
32 See: Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2015).  
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providing scope for Riyadh and Tehran to compete for regional hegemony. The two 
states have conflicting views of the construction of regional security, with Saudi 
Arabia reliant upon the US as a military guarantor, whilst Iran holding that its history 
and power leave it uniquely qualified to ensure control; indeed, Iran is calling for a 
Regional Dialogue Forum to shape security calculations across the Persian Gulf.  
 
Anti-Iranian sentiment increased under MbS as he sought to prevent further Iranian 
influence across the region amidst suggestions of the establishment of an “Iranian 
land bridge” from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea. 33  Containment efforts 
particularly played out in Lebanon and Yemen, although it should be stressed that 
competition continued in Iraq and Syria, whilst Bahrain was largely closed off to 
Iranian activity.34 Whilst Lebanon and Yemen are two very different arenas of 
competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran, in both cases Saudi foreign policy has 
struggled to achieve its goals.  
 
In Lebanon, the rivalry is largely played out through the use of proxies, such as the 
March 8 and March 14 alliances and the construction of networks of economic 
interest that predominantly – although not exclusively – revolve around sectarian 
interests.35 Perhaps the most obvious example of the influence of MbS on the 
Lebanese arena concerns the treatment of the Lebanese Prime Minister, Saad Hariri. 
Hariri, a long time Saudi ally was summoned to the royal palace at 8.30am on the 
second morning of a trip to the Kingdom that was designed as a means of countering 
Iranian influence. Upon his arrival at the palace, Hariri was stripped of his cell phone 
and given a pre-written speech to announce his resignation, before being placed 
under house arrest. Although the motives behind such action remain unclear, it is 
largely accepted that the speech was written as a consequence of Riyadh’s 
increasing concerns at Hariri’s inability to stand up to Hizballah and, by extension, 
Iran.36 Yet after a spate of diplomatic efforts, Hariri was allowed to return to Beirut, 
whereupon his resignation was rescinded and his popularity – along with that of 
Hizballah – has increased. Established in 1982 with Iranian support, the Party of God 
serves as an integral part of Iranian foreign policy across the Levant, providing scope 
to counter threats from Israel, but also with the ability to shape events in 
neighbouring states.37 Understanding the importance of Hizballah to Tehran helps to 
understand the importance of Syria, which serves as a means of providing support to 
Hizballah. Of course, the extent to which Iran wields influence over Hizballah is 
contested, particularly after the 2006 war with Israel, allegedly undertaken without a 
‘green light’ from Tehran.38   
 
                                                 
33 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/08/iran-iraq-syria-isis-land-corridor  
34 Simon Mabon, ‘The End of the Battle of Bahrain’, Middle East Journal, Forthcoming.  
35 See post 2006 rebuilding in Dahiya.  
36 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/24/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-saad-hariri-
mohammed-bin-salman-lebanon.html  
37 See James Worrall, Simon Mabon and Gordon Club, Hezbollah: From Islamic Resistance to 
Government (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2015). For in-depth discussion about the relationship 
between Iran and Hizballah see chapters 5 and 6.  
38 Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Power and Rivalry in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2015). 
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In Yemen, the Kingdom’s military excursion was designed to prevent the emergence 
of what was seen to be an Iranian ‘client state’ on the southern border of Saudi 
Arabia. Whilst Defence Minister, MbS launched Operation Decisive Storm, designed 
to crush Houthi rebels who were perceived to be receiving military support from 
Iran. US diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks rejected this claim in the mid-2000s, 
yet such assertions have become generally accepted in the international community. 
Saudi allegations are also shared by analysts in Yemen, who date Iranian penetration 
of Yemen back to around 2007 – some 30 years after Saudi intervention – yet there 
is a great deal of suspicion that in spite of Iranian penetration, it is Saudi Arabia that 
will be left to facilitate the eventual rebuilding process.39 Drawing on the close 
friendship with bin Zayed, MbS was able to call on Emirati support for Saudi military 
action, along with Egypt, Bahrain, and Qatar, although Doha’s expulsion from the 
Saudi-led coalition reflected escalating tensions between the two.40  
 
The complexity of the situation in Yemen resulted in fluid alliances around – yet not 
defined by – religious identities, where long-standing rivals sometimes found 
themselves working towards the same goals across short periods of time.  Yet the 
demographic organisation of Yemen has resulted in devastating loss of life and 
damage to the infrastructure of the state. With it has brought allegations of war 
crimes against Saudi Arabia.41 Although this military action was initially supported by 
the US, although as civilian deaths surge the pressure to curtail military action 
increased. Yet prior to peace talks beginning, many expect Saudi Arabia to meet its 
military targets and change ‘facts on the ground’ to strengthen their negotiating 
position;42 for the time being, Riyadh struggles to exert its desired level of impact.  
 
In addition to Iranian belligerence, the second dimension of Saudi foreign policy 
concerned Qatar, which was framed as a sponsor of terrorism, a supporter of 
Islamist groups and framed as guilty of an apparent rapprochement with Iran beyond 
the existence of the shared South Pars gas field. Events in Syria in the previous years 
had caused trepidation stemming from Doha’s efforts to co-ordinate the anti-Assad 
campaign and desire to channel funding through its networks.43 Though ultimately 
unsuccessful, the attempt to circumvent, or perhaps challenge, Saudi leadership 
across the region was a cause of concern to many in Riyadh.  
 
                                                 
39 Interview with analysts based in Yemen, 2018.  
40 Many in Oman have been critical of the “Yemen adventure”, including Sultan Qaboos, who 
are concerned about the destabilizing impact of the conflict upon the region, alongside the 
catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Oman has been free of violence since the Dhofar 
Rebellion and has explicitly stated its vision as a nation of peace. 
http://www.mei.edu/content/article/oman-s-high-stakes-yemen  






42 http://jmepp.hkspublications.org/2016/11/25/saudi-arabia-assertive-foreign-policy/  
43 Christopher Philips, ‘Eyes Bigger Than Stomachs: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar in Syria’,  
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A secondary area of concern was the continued support to Islamist groups across the 
region, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, who are viewed with suspicion 
by Saudi Arabia and the UAE since the Gulf War and, particularly after the Arab 
Uprisings.44 Doha had been home to Khaled Meshaal, the leader of Hamas, for a 
number of years and Yusuf Al Qaradawi, an influential Egyptian theologian was also 
based there. For Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, the Brotherhood was seen as a threat to the 
stability and legitimacy of closed political systems and demand for reform. Support 
for the Brotherhood in Egypt after the toppling of Hosni Mubarak was a source of 
great concern for many in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, whose views of the ikhwan 
were shaped by political concerns. Moreover, the international coverage of events in 
Egypt – in a positive light –  and across the region more critically, by the Qatari 
owned Al Jazeera served as a mouthpiece for Doha’s foreign policy.45 
 
On 5th June 2017, ambassadors from Saudi Arabia and its allies Bahrain, UAE and 
Egypt were withdrawn from Qatar and their citizens were ordered to leave the 
country. In addition, the countries gave Qatari citizens 14 days to return home. Land 
and sea borders were closed and Saudi and Emirati flights to Doha were cancelled. 
Similar events had occurred in 2014, where ambassadors were once more 
withdrawn, only to return in time for the 35th Summit Meeting of the GCC in Qatar in 
early December.46 In an effort to normalise relations, a list of demands was issued by 
the Saudi-led bloc, demanding a heavy price for resetting relations, including the 
closure of Al Jazeera,47 albeit coming from an actor that sought to breech the other’s 
sovereignty.  
 
In response, those visiting Doha in the summer of 2017 would see the face of Emir 
Tamim looking down over the city, from the sides of multi-story buildings, to the 
back windows of taxis, as a newfound Qatari nationalist sentiment emerged in 
response to perceived Saudi aggression. Yet such action was not taken alone. 
Instead, on his visit to Riyadh in the spring of 2017, it is suggested that Trump 
gave Riyadh the green light to act against Qatar,  48 later tweeting that   
 
“During my recent trip to the Middle East I stated that there can no longer be 
funding of Radical Ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar – look!”49 Trump later 
tweeted “So good to see the Saudi Arabia visit with the King and 50 countries 
                                                 
44 https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/POMEPS_GCC_Qatar-Crisis.pdf#page=52  
45 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar: The Gulf’s Problem Child, (The Atlantic, 05.06.17) 
Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/qatar-gcc-saudi-
arabia-yemen-bahrain/529227/  
46 Phillip Walter Wellman, 3 Gulf States Withdraw Ambassadors from Qatar (VOA, 05.03.14) 
Available at: https://www.voanews.com/a/saudi-arabia-bahrain-uae-withdraw-
ambassadors-from-qatar/1864426.html 
47 Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi, Qatar May Have to Pay Heavy Price to Restore Links to Gulf 
Neighbours, (Newsweek, 05.06.17) Available at:  http://sultanalqassemi.com/articles/qatar-
may-have-to-pay-heavy-price-to-restore-links-to-gulf-neighbours/  
48 https://www.juancole.com/2018/01/trump-engineered-attack.html  
49 Donald Trump, 06.06.17 Available at 
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already paying off. They said they would take a hard line on funding…50 
…extremism, and all reference was pointing to Qatar. Perhaps this will be the 
beginning of the end to the horror of terrorism!51 
 
It is hardly surprising that the blockade of Qatar went some way to altering the 
construction of regional security, as ties between Turkey and Qatar became much 
stronger. Within this relationship, a number of areas were strengthened, including 
military ties, economic investment, and agreements over food supplies52 highlighting 
the realignment of actors across the Sunni world, distinct from  Riyadh and, in turn, 
creating a number of challenges that could emerge in the coming years. 
Be Wary of the Winds of Change  
 
There is little doubt that Saudi Arabia is at a point of existential transformation. 
Facing serious economic crises, growing calls for political reform and seemingly 
endemic corruption, MbS faces a number of serious domestic challenges. Yet his 
moves are increasingly popular across the Kingdom as a growing number of Saudis 
support his reform efforts. Perhaps the most important aspect of recent events is 
speed. Whilst MbS is in his early 30s and speed is not seen as an obstacle, the social 
fabric of the Saudi state is far more conservative and characterised by bureaucratic 
and theological inertia. Rapid change away from conservative values of Islam, tribe 
and tradition could prove deeply unsettling for Saudi Arabia. How the Crown Prince 
deals with these domestic challenges will be revealing, particularly if – as expected – 
he is appointed King in the not too distant future.  
 
Yet it is in the realm of foreign policy that the bigger concerns are revealed. The 
continuation of conflict in Yemen with a catastrophic impact on the country will have 
serious repercussions, in perceptions of the Kingdom if nothing else. Whilst previous 
failures to address regional challenges such as the Yemen conflict have cost 
prominent princes key political portfolios, it is hardly likely that MbS will be removed 
from post. After all, after the spate of arrests that decimated the upper echelons of 
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